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Introduction
In December 2013, Temple University announced that they would be eliminating
seven varsity sports from their athletic department. Athletic Director Kevin Clark cited
“tightening budgets, the need to get Title IX complaint, and the state of the university's
facilities” as the main reasons that Temple had to discontinue the programs.1 Temple is not
alone, as over time, many collegiate athletic departments have discontinued specific sports
for various reasons. Oftentimes a department claims a need to ‘comply with Title IX
regulation’, a federal legislation prohibiting discrimination on the basis of gender, as the
primary reason for discontinuing an athletic program. In other cases, schools have cited a
need to reduce athletic department spending. Regardless of the reason, discontinued
programs generate a windfall of previously allocated funds to athletic departments. In the
current study, I examine how expenses get reallocated within an athletic department
following the discontinuation of an athletic team. In particular, I investigate whether funds
are reallocated to the remaining sports or simply saved for other purposes. Furthermore, if
the funds are reallocated, I investigate the manner in which these saved expenses get
distributed to the remaining sports.
This study attempts to answer these questions by examining what happens to the
expenses of a team once an athletic department decides to discontinue an athletic program.
Drawing from the consumer products industry, where companies often eliminate, sell off,
or divest low-performing operating segments or product lines for strategic purposes, it is
possible that universities decide to similarly terminate specific teams from their athletic
1

Menta, N. (2013, December 6). Temple to cut 7 athletic programs. Comcast SportsNet
Philadelphia. Retrieved April 30, 2014, from http://www.csnphilly.com/ncaa/temple-cut7-athletic-programs
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department in order to reallocate expenses to better performing units. When a company
eliminates a particular segment of their organization, they are often motivated by profit
maximization objectives. If one were to consider athletic departments in the same category
as these companies, (both making decisions with profits in mind) it would be completely
reasonable to expect their strategies to be consistent with each other. If an athletic
department were to consider profit motives, it may be prudent to divest in low-profit areas.
Smaller sports, such as tennis or wrestling, although not as expensive as football, still cost a
substantial amount of money to fund each year. Unlike football though, these sports often
do not generate significant revenue for the department, or university at large. Ticket sales
and sport-specific merchandise for low-revenue producing sporting events often do not
cover the associated costs of supporting these athletic programs. Thus, it would be
practical for an athletic department to make the decision to cut one or more of these ‘lowrevenue-producing’ teams, and reallocate the saved expenses to teams that are more
successful at bringing in revenue.
Therefore, this study looks at the average growth rates of schools that have
eliminated sport teams from their athletic department over the last several years. When
looking at these growth rates, I was interested in whether or not there was any abnormal
activity around the time of the sport team cut. Whether there was a sharp increase in
expenses, or a noticeable decrease, this study attempts to determine how saved expenses
are allocated post elimination. Were schools actually making cuts for their openly
expressed rationale?
The results of the research show that the treatment schools, which discontinued a
sports team from their athletic department, are disproportionately reallocating their cost-
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savings to football. Furthermore, 1-year averages indicate that there was no discernable
effect on the expenses of athletic departments one year after a cut was made. However,
when evaluating the 3-year average results, it appears that schools are in fact
redistributing their expenses unevenly towards football. The 3-year average growths for
the football expenses of treatment schools were higher than the control groups in each test.
Additionally, the 3-year football expense growths were higher than those of the lowerrevenue sports when compared to 2 of the 3 control groups, showing that football is in fact
receiving more of the cost reallocation.

Related Literature
In the consumer products industry, there has been a recent trend to sell off, or
‘divest’, one’s non-core brands. The thought process is that these companies want to focus
their resources on core segments or higher margin products. By ‘shedding’ smaller,
underperforming brands, companies can then focus their attention and allocate more
resources to their core segments.2 Recently, the company ValueClick displayed this strategy
by selling its ‘O&O’ segments. The company specified a need to focus more on its “core” and
“high-margin” segments. By dropping its low-performing segments in order to invest more
resources into its higher performing areas, ValueClick intends to spur “future growth.”3
My theory is that this same thought process could be applied to collegiate athletic
departments. Similar to firms divesting, or eliminating low performing segments, I expect
2 Divest and deliver. (2013). Retrieved from https://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local
Assets/Documents/MA/us_ma_Consumer Products selling-off brands POV_02262013.pdf

3 Valueclick to divest o&o segment. (2013, december 16). Retrieved from
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/valueclick-divest-o-o-segment-212505917.html
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that athletic departments are using their saved expenses to further fund the department’s
core or higher-revenue generating sports. In many ways, a collegiate athletic department is
similar to a business operating for profit. Just as a business is pressured to earn profits by
its shareholders, collegiate athletic departments are pressured to generate income for the
university. Seen by some as “corporate businesses that pay no taxes,” these sport
departments also strive to bring in as much money as possible4. Successful athletic
departments generate volumes of publicity for their institutions, similar to how successful
companies add to their brand. When a company provides a quality product or service, the
reputation of that brand increases. This same logic can be applied to college athletic
departments, as when a team succeeds on the field, the university gains acknowledgement.
Moreover, there is always incentive for a department to succeed because when a
department is winning, there is an increase in school spirit, which is often followed by an
increase in donations from alumni and prominent school supporters5.

Hypothesis
As some athletic departments see specific sports ‘underperforming’, they drop those
teams in order to use the saved expenses elsewhere. Following a reduction in the number
of athletic teams actively competing for the institution, I expect athletic departments to
reallocate a disproportionate percentage of cost savings to high-revenue producing sports.
As such, I test the following hypothesis, stated in alternative form:

Woods, R. (2011). Social issues in sports. (2nd ed.). Retrieved from
http://www.humankinetics.com/excerpts/excerpts/intercollegiate-athletic-programs-effect-on-universityenrollment-fundraising
5 Woods, R.

4

6
H: The percentage of total expenses allocated to the highest (lowest) revenue-generating sports will
increase (decrease) following other sports being cut from the department.

This was the case at Northeastern University, where the school came out and openly cited
their reason for cutting specific teams as a need to “invest in signature strengths” such as
hockey and basketball.6 Instead of explaining a need to comply with Title IX, or make
budget cuts, Northeastern took a different approach and directly justified their
discontinuations as a strategic move to prioritize their top revenue generating sports.
It is also possible that we see the opposite effect on expenses. Perhaps when a
department cuts a sport, the expenses of the other lower revenue-generating teams see a
disproportionate increase in their expenses. It is also conceivable that no effect on
expenses is detected at all. A department could discontinue a program, and just keep the
saved expenses, causing there to be no measurable change.

Research Design
In order to detect any abnormal growth rates in expenses per sport, this study has
three group-sets of departments: one group consisting of all of the departments that have
experienced a cut, one group consisting of departments that match in conference and size,
and one group consisting of every college/university in the United States. Growth was
calculated in expenses per year, per sport. Growth was computed in two ways, the first
using a 3-year moving average, and the second using a simple one-year average.

6 Too costly, football done at northeastern. (2009, November 23). Retrieved from
http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/ncf/news/story?id=4681701
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To calculate a multi-year moving average, the following equation was used:
Growth Rate= [(f/s)^(1/y)] – 1, where:
• f = final value or expense
• s = starting value or expense
• y = number of years
First, the final value was divided by the starting value. In this study, the three-year moving
average is computed by taking the third year being observed, and dividing it by the first.
For example, if there were 3 consecutive years of expenses of $400,000, $500,000, and
$600,000, one would divide $600,000 by $400,000. Then, one would raise the quotient to
the power of 1/y, which in this case is 1/3. One was subtracted from this answer to get the
growth number. For the purpose of this study, the equation was:
Growth Rate = ((Year n+2 expense / Year n expense)^(1/3)-1))
The second growth rate used was a simple 1-year average growth. The equation for this
growth was as follows:
Growth Rate = (Year n+1 expense- year n expense) / year n expense
When compiling a team’s expenses over the years, I looked for any abnormal spikes
in growth. When looking at the data, I expected to see a larger growth percentage a year or
two after the sport cut took place. Nonetheless, it could be that the changes in expenses are
just part of a normal growth pattern. In order to get a baseline on normal growth per sport,
I compared each school that has experienced a cut, to a school of similar size in their
conference. By doing so, I was able to better pinpoint whether or not that ‘spike’ could
actually be attributed to the cut.
In selecting the control group, I decided to use schools of the same conference,
similar enrollment size, and comparable athletic department revenues. Conference was a
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good measure of a similar athletic department because schools in the same conference are
often located in relatively the same geographic location, and are of generally similar
competition levels. Competition level is important because schools of different conferences
often spend different amounts on their sports. For example, a football team in the SEC
(South Eastern Conference) is most likely going to spend more on their football team
expenses than a team from the CAA (Colonial Athletic Association). Also, the size of the
schools and athletic department revenue were used because schools of different sizes often
have different levels of resources that they could use to pay for sports’ expenses. To find
the control group, I went to the US Department of Education’s website. Here, schools were
sortable by conference. After selecting the conference of the university that I was finding a
match for, I then located the school that was closest in both enrollment size and athletic
department revenue.
The research consisted of three parts. First, all of the expenses per sport for each
school in the group sets were collected. As described in the data section below, this was
done by going to the US Department of Education’s website. Once the expenses were
collected, the growth rates per sport were calculated, using the two different equations
above. This left two numbers per sport, per school: the 3-year moving average growth rate,
and the 1-year growth rate. Once the growth rates were compiled, the treatment group and
three sets of controls for both the 3-year and 1-year rates were created. The treatment
group was each school that experienced a cut in this sample period. For each year in the
study (2001-2013), only the schools that had eliminated a sport in that year were selected,
and their growth rates were averaged together. For example, in 2003, Drexel University,
Canisius College, Fairfield University and St. Johns University all had a cut. So the growth
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rate for each sport in 2003 was an average of these four schools’ rates. The first control
group was the same as the treatment group, but with the matched schools instead of the
schools whom made a cut. The second control group was compiled using the matched
schools, as well as the treatment schools who did not have a cut that year. For example, in
2003, the growth rates would be an average of the matched schools’ rates in addition to the
all of the treatment schools’ rates not including the four schools above. Finally, the third
control group consisted of the average rates of all the universities in the US.
The third step in the process was to calculate the difference in growth rates between
the treatment group, and each of the control groups. . It was feasible that during some
years, large portions of the schools all saw an increase or decrease due to industry factors
outside of our study. Hence, a year-by-year approach was taken, comparing each school to
each other as well as the control population. This method offset any patterns of either
growth or decline that existed across all of college sports. Taking the difference by year
ultimately accounts for any macroeconomic shocks.
From here, the growth rate differences were averaged for each year to get one
number per sport. Then the rates per sport were compiled into two groups: high revenue
generating sports, and low revenue generating sports. A positive number in either group
would indicate that the treatment schools are experiencing higher growth than the controls.
A higher growth rate would suggest that schools that cut a sport are seeing their expenses
rise at a faster pace, and hence, reallocating more money to the remaining teams. Also, a
higher number for the high revenue generating sports in comparison to the low revenue
sports would show that sports such as football and basketball are receiving a greater
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proportion of the cost savings in comparison to smaller sports such as swimming, baseball,
etc.

Data
The schools selected for this study were all Division 1 universities that had
experienced some type of cut in their athletic department from the 2000-2013. Schools
were selected using various Google searches. I did find a few articles that included several
schools each, but to my knowledge, no all-inclusive list of schools that have made cuts
existed.
Expenses for these schools were obtained through the U.S. Department of
Education’s website, using their “Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool.” The data
dates back to the 2000-2001 school year, as limited by the U.S. Department of Education’s
website. Schools are responsible for reporting their numbers directly to the agency.
However, there is no reason to suspect that the schools in treatment would bias their
numbers differently from non-treated schools. Therefore, it was assumed that the expenses
and revenues provided to the website are accurate. 7

Results
The results for the 3-year and 1-year average growth rates were somewhat varied.
When looking at the 1-year growth rates, the treatment group generally had lower growth
7 It must be noted that each growth rate calculated that exceeded 1, or 100%, was changed
to 0. There were rates that reached 500%+. Because it cannot be determined whether or
not these rates were the result of human submission error, I changed any rate above 100%.
Also, it can be noted that the same tests were conducted with each exceeded growth rate
changed to 1 instead of 0. The results were of the same quantitative value, confirming the
outcome.
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rates for both the high and low-revenue generating sports in comparison to the control
groups.
Differences in 1-Year Growth Rates

High Revenue
(Football and
Basketball)
Low Revenue (all
others)
High Revenue
(Football)
Low Revenue (all
others)

Treatment vs.
Matched Control
Group

Treatment vs.
Matched +
Remaining
Treatment

Treatment vs.
Universe Control
Group

-0.184%

-0.283%

-0.114%

0.096%

-0.155%

-1.183%

0.541%

0.243%

0.670%

0.033%

-0.195%

-1.170%

As seen above, I created two groups of high revenue sports. In one, I included the
top two revenue-generating sports for colleges in the US. However, because football is
substantially more profitable than basketball, I decided to make a second group with just
football. When looking at the ‘just football’ numbers, there is a small increase in growth
rates in comparison to all three control groups.
Moreover, the 3-year growth rates have slightly different results. The fact that every
situation yielded a positive percentage demonstrates that treatment group had a higher
percentage growth than the control. Hence, treatment schools were reallocating more
money towards their remaining sports. When the high revenue group consisted of both
basketball and football, it grew at a lower rate than the low revenue group in all three
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control situations. Still, when isolated alone, football grew at a higher rate than the low
revenue groups in two out of the three control situations.8
Differences in 3-Year Growth Rates
Treatment vs.
Matched Control
Group
High Revenue
(Football and
Basketball)
Low Revenue (all
others)
High Revenue
(Football)
Low Revenue (all
others)

Treatment vs.
Universe Control
Group

0.156%

Treatment vs.
Matched +
Remaining
Treatment
5.375%

0.567%

5.573%

0.309%

1.060%

5.231%

0.770%

0.480%

5.569%

0.250%

0.014%

Robustness
One of the factors to be considered when designing the study was how to determine
the average growth rate. I chose to use both a 3-year moving average growth and a 1-year
simple average growth. With a multi-year average, I was able to see any true spikes in
growth and it allowed for smoothing out any changes. With a 3-year average growth, I
could see if schools delayed the allocation of their cost savings. It is practical that a school
could cut a sport, and wait a year or two to redistribute the savings to the remaining sports.
A school may be able to immediately redistribute variable costs that were saved from a cut,
but some fixed expenses may take longer to become available. With a 3-year average, any
delays in reallocation could be accounted for.

8

Because our treatment sample size was only 30, our results are not irrefutable. Future
research should be done with a larger sample size to help validate the conclusions this
study came to.
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Limitations
Due to the low number of observations in this study, several factors were not
considered in the research. For example, the study did not parse the sample by the reason
given for each department’s discontinuation. There was a wide array of explanations that
schools gave as to why they decided to make their cuts. Between Title IX compliance,
budget constraints, facility restrictions and conference elements, schools described their
rationale in different ways. If the sample size of this study were larger, the research could
have been broken down into categories, separated by reason for the cut. Additionally, given
the restraints of both the sample size and data availability, this study was not able to
examine the role of gender in relation to these discontinuations. Future research can be
done relating to the gender of the sport team cut, and its effect on cost-savings reallocation.

Discussion
It appears that schools are in fact reallocating their saved expenses, but taking a few
years to do so. I do not detect positive differences in growth between the treatment and
controls after only one year. However, I do see a positive difference in all situations when
looking at the 3-year averages. Perhaps institutions are taking a year or two after a cut to
reallocate those saved expenses. As discussed in the ‘Robustness’ section of this paper, it is
completely feasible that a school may not redistribute the cost savings from elimination for
at least a year after the elimination was made. Some of the fixed costs associated with the
sport cut may take some time to come off the books. It is likewise possible that schools are
either holding onto the savings for some time before reallocating, or spreading out the
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savings over a few years. In either case, these reallocations of the saved expenses would
show up in a 3-year growth average, rather than the 1-year average, which is measuring
just the one-year growth after the cut.
In examining the high/low revenue generating sport breakdown of results, I can see
that clearly football is receiving a greater percentage of the cost savings. For the 1-year
growth rates, football is growing at a greater percentage than all of the other sports. But
because most of the rates are less than the control groups, we cannot attribute the greater
percentage to a disproportionate reallocation. The fact that the control rates are higher
than the treatment rates in general would mean that there likely isn’t a reallocation at all.
In this case, schools are probably just spending more money on football than they are on
other sports.
However, when isolating the 3-year average growths, this greater percentage
becomes more significant. Because all of the differences are positive, it can be said that
schools that make a cut are taking the saved expenses and then reallocating them to the
remaining sports, causing these schools to have a higher growth percentage. Of the sports
receiving these saved expenses, it would appear that the highest revenue generating sport,
football, is receiving a disproportionate percentage.
When comparing football to the rest of the sports, it grew at a higher rate in two of
the three control situations. Football’s expense growth rate difference from the matched
control group was 1.06%, while the lower revenue generating sports had a difference of
0.48%. Subsequently, when compared to the entire collegiate population, football’s growth
rates were 0.77% higher, while the lower percentage sports were only 0.25% higher.
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These percentages may not seem significant at 1.06% and .77%, but when we are dealing
with millions of dollars, these percentages equate to substantial amounts.9

Conclusion
The results indicate that football teams are receiving a disproportionate amount of
the cost-savings that result when a sport is terminated from a department. Consider how
the collegiate football team’s average revenue in 2013 was just less than three times that of
basketball ($3,061,739.85 vs. $1,115,030.96).10 When seeing the discrepancy between
football’s revenue generating power, and that of the next highest grossing sport, basketball,
it is very understandable as to why schools might be allocating their savings this way. If a
company had both a profitable segment similar to football, and segments that lost money
such as fencing and tennis, it would be completely practical for that company to divest in
the poorly performing segments. Essentially, this is what some college athletic departments
are doing. In order to maximize profit, these schools are discontinuing poorly performing
segments, and reinvesting the cost-savings in their highest grossing areas. Although certain
departments may be cutting sports to truly comply with Title IX regulation, or to meet a
particular budget limit, it is clear that others are simply practicing a profit maximization
strategy.

9 1.06% of the average football expense in the treatment group for 2013 would equate to
$102,767
10 Equity in Athletics Data Analysis Cutting Tool Website. (n.d.). Equity in Athletics Data
Analysis Cutting Tool Website. Retrieved April 29, 2014, from http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/

Comment [JS1]: Perhaps you can quantify
these amounts, rather than just saying
‘substantial’.
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Appendix 1

Cincinnati Example
3-Year Growth Rates Per Sport

20012003

Sport

20022004

20032005

20042006

20052007

20062008

20072009

20082010

200920011

20102012

20112013

Football

9.22%

3.97%

-0.77%

6.32%

3.17%

5.39%

10.63%

8.11%

1.94%

2.78%

13.87%

Baseball

3.33%

14.53%

5.47%

11.41%

3.96%

-3.55%

0.59%

7.57%

4.09%

4.79%

9.09%

Soccer

5.73%

10.19%

3.58%

6.11%

9.20%

9.72%

4.42%

2.65%

0.12%

4.12%

7.79%

Swimming

5.56%

4.99%

-4.98%

4.80%

9.49%

1.10%

-2.44%

4.21%

-2.14%

-4.39%

0.67%

Cut was made

Sport
Football
Baseball
Soccer
Swimming

Average of four periods before cut
Cut
Average of four periods after cut
3.53%
10.63%
6.67%
4.32%
0.59%
6.39%
7.15%
4.42%
3.67%
2.60%
-2.44%
-0.41%

Above are two tables consisting of 3-year growths rates for different sports at the University of
Cincinnati. The first table is a simple year-by-year breakdown of the growth percentages by
sport. In the second table, the growth rates are broken down into three columns. The first is
the average of the growth rates four periods before the sport was eliminated from the program.
The second column is the growth rate average from the year of the cut, and the third column is
the average of the growth rates four periods after.
The University of Cincinnati is an example of a school that seemed to disproportionately
reallocate their cost savings towards their highest revenue generating sport, football.
Cincinnati made the decision to eliminate the women’s rowing team from their athletic
program at the end of the 2006-2007 school year. Citing a strain on the budget program, the
move removed rowing expenses, which were last reported at $623,366. Looking at the table
above, it would appear that a disproportionate amount of the saved expenses were reallocated
to the football team. During the four periods leading up to the cut, the football team had an
average 3-year growth of 3.53%. After the cut was made, that growth percentage increased
substantially to 10.63%, and then declined down to 6.67% after the cut. When looking at lowrevenue generating sports such as baseball, soccer and swimming, we see a different effect.
Growth rates for these sports actually decreased after the elimination of the rowing team.

18
Table 1: University Comparisons
Conference
CAA
Big East
Pac-12
MAC
MAC
ACC
Big East
Pac-12
Missouri Valley
Atlantic-10
America East
Horizon League
Horizon League
CAA
Atlantic 10
Missouri Valley
Summit League
America East
MAAC
Atlantic Sun
MAAC
CAA
MAAC
Atlantic 10
CAA
Big East
WCC
MAAC
MAAC
CAA

School
Delaware
Rutgers
Washington
Ball State
Ohio U
Clemson
Cincinnati
Stanford
Indiana State
UMass
Maine
Cleveland State
Detroit Mercy
Drexel
Duquesne
Northern Iowa
South Dakota
Vermont
Canisius
ETSU
Fairfield
Hofstra
Iona
La Salle
Northeastern
St. Johns
St. Mary’s
Saint Peter’s
Siena
James Madison

Enrollment
16,639
29,928
26,193
15,594
16,855
15,570
19,615
16,999
8,669
20,177
7,477
8,472
2,239
13,061
5,640
9,635
4,597
9,803
2,930
10,175
3,456
6,359
2,924
3,553
13,107
10,844
2,776
1,895
3,035
17,302

Total
29,207,394
71,851,419
85,072,886
22,644,535
27,265,061
68,163,948
45,065,244
90,490,234
11,685,797
28,659,514
16,930,269
11,290,814
15,320,679
21,014,774
16,498,821
14,623,381
10,291,561
16,889,595
10,968,595
10,331,210
16,559,155
19,490,463
10,563,647
13,011,972
24,678,519
27,182,921
14,166,984
6,865,794
12,448,673
36,072,842

School’s Match
Old Dominion
UConn
UCLA
Western Michigan
Western Michigan
Georgia Tech
Pittsburgh
USC
Western Illinois
VCU
Maryland-BC
Loyola-Chicago
Valparaiso
Northeastern
Xavier
Youngstown State
Missouri-KC
Maryland-BC
Niagara
North Florida
Loyola Maryland
William and Mary
Siena
St. Joes
URI
DePaul
Portland
Manhattan
Marist
Old Dominion

Enrollment
14,883
16,587
27,365
16,228
16,228
13,190
17,223
17,497
9,161
19,511
9,357
8,793
2,830
13,107
4,065
9,795
6,792
9,357
2,799
10,200
3,871
6,091
3,035
4,424
11,841
13,627
3,320
3,141
4,760
14,883

Total
36,929,483
63,374,981
83,926,720
25,458,301
25,458,301
63,630,964
57,606,235
97,802,24
11,894,172
25,749,624
13,243,292
12,508,656
13,665,267
24,678,519
17,631,245
13,632,988
12,505,432
13,243,292
9,467,780
9,379,425
17,116,223
20,494,594
12,448,673
17,732,229
23,167,551
25,343,254
12,917,933
9,873,118
12,206,989
36,929,483

(Enrollment and Revenue Source: http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/)
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Table 2: University Reason for Sport Elimination
School

Year
of Cut

Publically
Stated Reason

Link

Delaware

2011

Title IX

Rutgers
Washington

2007
2009

Budget ‘shortfall’
Budget ‘cuts’

Ball State

2004

Reduce expenses

Ohio U

2007

Title IX, expenses

Clemson

Facility
Restrictions

Cincinnati

Phase
out
20102012
2007

http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/02/sports/02gender.h
tml
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=2519938
http://seattletimes.com/html/sports/2009157966_budget
cuts02.html
http://www.nwitimes.com/sports/college/ball-state-toeliminate-men-s-cross-country-trackteams/article_d47d42a4-67ff-581d-a0287ff0397e112e.html
http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2007/01/ohio-universitydrops-four-sports.html
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=5152852

Stanford

2009

Budget ‘cuts’

Indiana State

2010

Budget ‘cuts’

UMass

2002

Maine

2009

Title IX, Save
expenses
Budget ‘challenges’

Cleveland State

2011

Facility reasons

Detroit Mercy

2004

Budget ‘cuts’

Drexel

2003

Duquesne
Northern Iowa
South Dakota

2010
2009
2004

Vermont

2009

‘strategic move to
remain in
alignment with
conference”
Budget ‘cuts’
Budget ‘cuts’
Focus on women’s
sports
Financial gap

Canisius

2003

Budget ‘cuts’

ETSU

2003

Fairfield

2003

Hofstra

2010

Iona

2009

Financial
constraints
More money for
financial aid
Cost and waning
interest
Dissolution of

Budget ‘cuts’

http://title-ix.blogspot.com/2008/01/end-of-road-forcincinnati-rowing.html
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/columns/story?id=43141
95
http://www.tribstar.com/local/x1155810323/ISU-cutswomen-s-men-s-tennis/print
http://www.umassathletics.com/sports/m-itrack/specrel/031102aaa.html
http://mainecampus.com/2009/04/13/volleyball-andmens-soccer-part-of-budget-cuts-for-2009/
http://www.cleveland.com/sports/csu/index.ssf/2011/05
/cleveland_state_university_dro.html
http://archives.commons.udmercy.edu/2013/04/05/takeme-out-to-the-ball-game-university-of-detroit-baseballteam-1895-2004/
http://articles.philly.com/2003-0517/sports/25460008_1_drexel-athletic-director-drexeluniversity-eric-zillmer
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=4858124
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncaa/news/story?id=3928837
http://www.keloland.com/newsdetail.cfm/usd-cutsbaseball-new-focus-on-womens-athletics/?id=31140
http://www.vermontcynic.com/2.12544/uvm-to-cutbaseball-softball-teams-1.1742208#.Uwd79PRdV9U
http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=2002
1115&id=7C0zAAAAIBAJ&sjid=RggGAAAAIBAJ&pg=5041,3
898812
http://www.tricities.com/news/article_ce89e002-f00d511c-b925-51c72e667577.html?mode=jqm
http://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/Fairfi
eld-Cuts-Football-Hockey-Teams-755456.php
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/sports/ncaafootbal
l/04hofstra.html
http://www.icgaels.com/ViewArticle.dbml?SPSID=64397&
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conference, lack of
opponents
Lack of opponents

La Salle

2008

Northeastern

2010

St. Johns

2003

St. Marys

2007

Strengthen other
sports

Saint Peter’s

2007

Conference
changes, facilities

Siena

2004

Conference
changes

James Madison

2007

Title IX

Invest in signature
strengths
Title IX, fairness

SPID=7109&DB_OEM_ID=14900&ATCLID=3619985
http://articles.philly.com/2007-1120/sports/25223996_1_football-program-college-footballscholarship-program
http://sports.espn.go.com/boston/ncf/news/story?id=468
1701
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/12/14/sports/colleges-stjohn-s-cites-fairness-in-cutting-5-men-s-teams.html
http://www.stmarys-ca.edu/saint-marys-collegediscontinues-intercollegiate-football-will-strengthenoverall-athletic-program
http://www.championshipsubdivisionnews.com/log/index
.php/2008/10/16/football-programs-a-dying-breed-atsmall?blog=2
http://www.championshipsubdivisionnews.com/log/index
.php/2008/10/16/football-programs-a-dying-breed-atsmall?blog=2
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college/other/20
07-04-19-title-ix-jmu-cover_N.htm
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Table 3: Full Results
1-Year Average Growth
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3-Year
Year Moving Average Growth

